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Abstract 
The need to address safety and security related aspects at an 
early stage of development of feedback control systems (FCS) 
has been identified as vital for the optimisation of the 
development process of military land systems. 
These systems often include network enabled capability 
(NEC) allowing the use of electronics architectures to 
integrate different sub-systems. However, this increased 
integration capability is associated with magnified safety risks 
and compromise from cyber attacks [4].    
This paper discusses how the process of developing FCS for 
military land systems could benefit from the use of a 
framework that addresses safety and security issues at the 
system modelling level.  
The core part of the suggested framework consists of a 
Simulink model to be used by design engineers as a blueprint 
for the development of a modular FCS that are expected to 
feature a modular architecture with dedicated sub-modules for 
the processing of data related to safety and security aspects. 
Since the FCS developed through the use of framework 
features a modular architecture, the anticipated cost incurred 
in the design of the associated modular safety case is expected 
to be reduced, leading to an overall reduction of  the cost of 
the re-certification process [1].  
1 Introduction 
Engineering systems from a variety of application domains 
have been increasingly exposed to the need for regular 
updates and upgrades. In systems where security and safety 
aspects are a major concern, technical modifications are 
typically followed by a re-certification process. The process 
of re-certifying a system is complex and costly, and from a 
safety and security perspective it has been advocated  [6] that 
in order to increase the effectiveness of the certification 
process there is the need to ensure that the safety analysis is 
started at an earlier stage of a system development cycle, so 
that the assurance case can actually influence design 
decisions. This argument together with the principles that 
enabled the application of the modular safety case approach 
for systems based on Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) [5] 
have played a vital role on the development of the framework. 
This framework was developed as part of a research 
programme funded by the UK MOD/DSTL. Particular effort 
was placed in designing a framework that could address, at a 
system design level, issues related with safety and security 
aspects of feedback control systems. 
Current military land systems increasingly rely on data 
networks to connect a vast array of vetronics (vehicle 
electronics) subsystems [2]. Therefore, it would be beneficial 
to consider the design of such feedback control systems while 
also taking into consideration safety and security aspects (e.g. 
end to end encryption).  
Section 2 of this paper presents an overview of the developed 
framework and in section 3 the safety and security extensions 
of the framework are explained. In section 4 a set of four 
theoretical case studies are presented with the objective of 
evaluating whether or not the use of the framework could 
bring benefits related to the safety and security aspects of 
feedback control systems. Section 5 concludes the paper and 
contains considerations about future work. 
 
2 Framework Overview 
The framework brings together in one development package 
the benefits associated with concepts such as integrated 
architectures [7], model driven system engineering (MSDE) 
[8], and modular safety cases [3].  Hence, providing design 
engineers with a structured development process that could 
lead to control systems architectures that are more adaptable 
for future changes and more efficient in application reuse. 
The suggested framework consists of a Simulink model to be 
used as a blueprint model for the development of FCS, and 
guidelines on how to start and navigate through the different 
modules of the model and understand the default data model 
of the Simulink model.  
Figure 1 shows the top level architecture of the Simulink 
model and how data flows between the modules. Each of 
these modules except the Control Input Unit Modules CIUMs 
and the Control Input Output Modules COUMs is made of the 
sub-modules shown in Figure 2.  
The interconnection between the modules of the Simulink 
model is achieved through the use of “bus based” links 
carrying dynamically configured bus data structures that are 
tagged into different categories.  
To develop a feedback control system for a specific 
application the design engineer will have to decide how many 
Control Input Unit Modules (CIUMs) are going to be used 
and customise them according to the requirements and 
specification of the application to be controlled. The same 
approach should be followed to customise the Control Output 
Unit Modules (COUMs). For the remaining modules the 
customisation should happen on the sub-modules of each 
module. Each module or sub-module should be customised 
with algorithms that implement the logic required by the 
application to be controlled and the outputs of the algorithms 
have to match the data bus format defined for the interfaces of 
each module. The framework also gives the possibility for 
design engineers to edit the default data model used in the 
Simulink model in order to have it adjusted to the 
requirements of the application to be controlled. This option 
adds extra complexity to the initial development of the FCS 
as it eventually requires the update of the algorithms of the 
internal sub-modules as well as the use of the bus editor 
facility to change the format of the data bus defined for the 
interfaces of each module and sub-module.  
 
3 Safety and Security considerations 
As it was mentioned in section 2, data flowing between the 
modules of the Simulink model is tagged into different 
categories. Data containing safety related information is 
tagged as safety data and data containing security related 
information is tagged as security data. Inside of each module 
of the Simulink model there are dedicated sub-modules to  
 
process safety data and security data as shown in Figure 2. 
These sub-modules can be customised with algorithms that 
implement the safety and security requirements of the 
application to be controlled.  
The safety and security capabilities of the developed FCS can 
be changed by simply changing the algorithms on the safety 
and security sub-modules of each module of the Simulink 
model. This facility not only could allow a faster response to 
overcome eventual vulnerabilities, but it could also reduce the 
probability of a cyber attack by changing the data encryption 
mechanism more often.  
One of the primary goals of the framework is to guide design 
engineers through a process to develop FCS, that addresses 
issues related with safety and security of FCS at the system 
design level. Hence, the presence of dedicated safety and 
security sub-modules in the framework’s default Simulink 
model. This allows design engineers to be aware of the safety 
and security aspects of the FCS early on in the development 
life cycle.  
Section 4 of this paper presents four theoretical case studies 
that were created to show how the use of the framework to 
develop FCS could bring long term benefits that vary from, 
increased safety and security capabilities, increased algorithm 
reusability, to an increased functional segmentation that can 
lead to the reduction of the cost incurred in the design of 
modular safety case associated with the feedback control 
system.  
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Figure 1 - Top level architecture of the Simulink model of the framework. 
Figure 2 - Processing segmentation inside the main modules of the framework 
 
 
4 Case Studies 
The following theoretical case studies aim to highlight the 
safety and security benefits that could be achieved through 
the use of the framework for the development of modular 
feedback control systems. The case studies are considered as 
a sequence of engineering development steps spanning 
throughout the lifetime of a drive-by-wire system, covering 
initial development, capability upgrades, and urgent critical 
updates. Such an example can be considered as applicable to 
both military land vehicles and modern / future civilian 
vehicles, as system safety and security are both directly linked 
with human safety. 
 
Case study 1. This case study shows the typical use of the 
framework for the initial development of a basic FCS for a 
drive-by-wire vehicle. The designer(s) will take the reference 
high-level model of the framework and by following the 
provided guidelines populate the relative sub-modules with 
the application specific algorithms and hardware / software 
interfaces. With full visibility of the model components, the 
developers will be able to customise and tailor any parts 
necessary to fit their application requirements, while at the 
same time having pre-prepared the generic elements that are 
common to typical FCS applications. The inherent presence 
of safety and security sub-components, already integrated into 
the model design, will provide a baseline to the developer(s) 
and enable smoother integration of the safety and security 
requirements with the development of the control algorithm’s 
functional and system requirements. The provided separation 
of the control algorithm (control and feedback), safety, and 
security sub-components will also enable their parallel 
development by multiple developers working on their 
individual specific designs, with a pre-existing integration 
path. 
At the end of the development cycle it is expected that the use 
of the framework to develop the FCS for the vehicle would 
result on a system design with a highly modular and 
generically structured core Simulink model. The design will 
feature minimal internal inter-dependencies between the 
algorithms running on the different blocks and sub-modules. 
By following these guidelines, it is thus made possible to 
keep future changes (or late-stage modifications due to last-
minute requirements changes or design fault detection) to 
modify existing components or integrate new ones confined 
to well-defined parts of the feedback control model. An 
optimised and simplified re-development procedure would 
also reduce the cost of re-certifying the modified system 
design [1] and lead to overall through-life cost savings. 
 
Case study 2.  This case study considers the requirement 
for integration of a new input (e.g. steering wheel) or output 
(e.g. actuator) device to the drive-by-wire system of the 
vehicle described in case study 1, as a replacement to an 
existing device. Such an example represents a typical scenario 
where a device has to be replaced with a new model due to 
the discovery of internal device design faults found post-
design, during mass-production, or post-production of the 
vehicle. Such a system change requirement could also be 
applicable to the adaptation of an existing drive-by-wire 
system to a new vehicle design. 
As the FCS of the vehicle was developed based on the 
framework, the replacement of the new device will require 
most changes to be applied to the device applicable sub- 
components, rather than the core control & feedback 
algorithm components. Such changes would require simply 
the replacement of a Control Input Unit Module (CIUM) or a 
Control Output Unit Module (COUM) with a new module, or 
by updating the internal algorithm of the existing modules if 
the functional differences are small. The modular and 
abstracted design of the model, combined with the 
standardised inter-communication of sub-modules, will make 
it possible for the remaining components of the control model 
not to have to be modified, unless the newly integrated device 
incorporates major changes to the functional operation of the 
whole system. 
Assuming that a modular safety case associated with the FCS 
from case study 1 had been produced and is available, the re-
certification process of the new FCS would only require 
changes in the relevant safety case module of the components 
that have been modified. In addition, considering that the 
security related aspects of the system remain the same despite 
the integration of a new device, the relative sub-blocks of the 
previous device’s model could also be reused. 
It is considered that scenarios such as the one presented in 
this case study would have much higher associated costs for 
development and certification, if conducted on a system 
design without design-time provisions for modular control, 
safety, and security. Additional benefits from a modular 
framework based approach would also be increased user / 
customer satisfaction gained from the quicker development 
cycle turn-around.  
 
Case study 3. This case study considers the introduction 
of an urgent requirement to modify, either partially or fully, 
the security aspects of the drive-by-wire system of the vehicle 
described in case study 1. Such an example would be 
applicable to highly inter-connected vehicle platforms, 
encompassing both military and civilian vehicle platforms 
that have presented a security vulnerability, which is 
exploitable and can potentially interfere with the safe control 
of the vehicle. It also highlights how the provisions for 
separated modules to process data related with safety and 
security aspects, made by the framework and integrated from 
the initial design of the system, can be beneficial in the long 
term. 
It is considered that the majority of the required changes 
would be focused on elements such as changes to signing / 
encryption certificates, encryption algorithm selection, and 
signing / encryption algorithm specific implementations. 
Modifications to the system’s model would thus be focused 
and isolated to the security sub-blocks without affecting the 
control and safety related elements. Any changes to the inter-
communication between the internal modules would also be 
easier to implement due to the structured bus-based and data 
model approach of the framework. Re-certification of the 
modified system design would be similar to the 2nd case 
study, through the use of a modular safety case approach. 
The overall benefits to the system designer would be similar 
to the 2nd case study, and possibly greater as the changes to 
the core control and safety elements could be minimal to 
none. 
 
Case study 4. This case study considers the typical 
scenario of an existing entity adopting the use of the 
framework while having an established FCS, using a gradual 
transition to keep associated costs spread throughout a longer 
period compared to a complete overhaul or redesign of the 
legacy system. 
The abstracted and modular design of the framework’s model 
allows the user to re-use legacy control algorithms by 
implementing a “black-box” approach where the existing 
control models are treated as independent entities and 
integrated within the framework’s modules. The framework’s 
model is thus effectively functioning as a wrapper creating a 
virtually modular FCS. The initial integration could 
implement all or parts (the most important and costly to 
redesign algorithms) of the legacy system. With the adoption 
of the framework’s model, the developer will also be able to 
use the security elements of the framework, effectively 
adding security related features to the legacy system. 
Following this initial integration, the developer will be able to 
upgrade the system (as described in case studies 2 & 3) 
gradually phasing out the legacy elements and ending up with 
a fully modular FCS. Such staggered development capability 
is considered a key enabler for the adoption of new concepts 
in areas where adoption of new technologies is inhibited due 
to the industry’s preference of using pre-existing and trusted 
technologies. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper presented the safety and security aspects of a 
modular framework developed to optimise the development 
process of feedback control systems for complex and critical 
systems, such as drive-by-wire implementations for military 
land systems and civilian vehicles. The structure of the 
framework was presented to show how safety and security 
aspects are integrated within the design and how the inherent 
abstraction and modular concepts of the framework aid the 
development process. A set of case studies were discussed to 
demonstrate the applicability of the framework and the 
possible benefits that can be gained at various points of the 
lifetime of a feedback control system. The continuous 
presence of safety and security aspects throughout all cases 
shows how such aspects can be considered simultaneously 
and at the same importance level as the core “feedback 
control” requirement of such a model. In addition, it is 
considered that this presence of the dedicated safety and 
security related sub-modules in the framework’s default 
Simulink model could have a very positive impact on a design 
engineers’ mind set. Such benefits could vary from an 
increased awareness for safety and security aspects from an 
early stage of the development of FCS, to being able to 
increase the security level of legacy systems.  
The results presented in this paper also indicate that the 
modular architecture and functional segmentation with 
integrated safety and security provisions, featured by 
feedback control systems developed with the framework, 
could enable the practicability of designing modular safety 
cases associated to the developed feedback control system. 
The advent of this practicability will reduce the cost of re-
certification of changed systems and lead to an overall 
through-life cost saving [1]. The benefits associated with the 
use of the framework as a development package could be 
particularly valuable to the military land systems industry, 
where the increased need to improve crew survivability has 
led to an increased frequency of required upgrades. Such 
upgrades have in some occasions been affected by very 
lengthy development and delivery times due to the 
complexity of the re-certification process. Similar to the 
military domain, modern and future civilian vehicles are 
becoming increasingly inter-connected, highlighting the need 
for heightened security requirements within the platform’s 
safety-critical sub-systems, along with the typical safety 
requirements. 
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